Saadut Hussain Pampori v. UT of J&K & Ors. — WP(C) No. 2269/2024
Advocate Syed Shabir Bukhari
There are occasions in constitutional jurisprudence when a judgment acquires significance beyond the immediate dispute before the Court. Such decisions serve as important reminders of the delicate balance between the legitimate interests of the State, the responsibilities of its administrative institutions and the enduring principles of the rule of law. The judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar in WP(C) No. 2269/2024, Saadut Hussain Pampori v. UT of J&K & Ors., decided on 29 August 2026, is one such decision.
Delivered by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Dhar, the judgment examines an important question arising at the intersection of national security, administrative discretion, service jurisprudence and procedural fairness. Its significance lies not merely in the ultimate relief granted to the petitioner, but in the Court’s careful effort to delineate the respective spheres of responsibility of the administration and the judiciary.
The judgment does not question the importance of protecting national security, nor does it seek to diminish the authority of the State to respond firmly where genuine threats to national security are established. On the contrary, it proceeds on the understanding that matters concerning national security may, by their very nature, require exceptional measures and considerable administrative responsibility. What the judgment underscores is a complementary constitutional principle: the greater the power, the greater the importance of ensuring that the power is exercised in the manner prescribed by law.
This approach is neither intended to impede the functioning of the administration nor to substitute judicial opinion for executive assessment in matters falling within the executive domain. Rather, it reflects the constitutional role of judicial review to ensure that powers conferred by law are exercised within the framework and safeguards that the law itself has prescribed.
“At the heart of the controversy was a simple but profound question”
Can an employee of a bank be dismissed from service without a departmental inquiry merely on the basis of governmental advice alleging involvement in anti-national activities, when the specific service rule invoked by the employer itself requires an investigation by a State/UT/Central Investigating Agency as a precondition?
The Hon’ble Court answered the question in the negative ,not by questioning the importance of national security, but by insisting that national security itself cannot become a substitute for the procedure prescribed by law.
The Genesis of the Litigation
The petitioner, Saadut Hussain Pampori, had joined the respondent-Bank as a Computer Engineer in 1995. His services were subsequently confirmed, and during his long career he held several important positions within the Bank, including assignments connected with information technology and senior management. According to the judgment, he ultimately rose to the position of Deputy General Manager.
On 15 April 2024, he was placed under suspension pending investigation into alleged misconduct. However, before a regular departmental inquiry could take place, the competent authority of the Bank passed an order dated 15 July 2024, dismissing him from service with immediate effect.
The Bank invoked Clause 12.29 of the Officers Service Manual (OSM), a special provision dealing with dismissal/removal of an employee found involved in terrorist or anti-national activities.
The petitioner challenged the dismissal before the High Court, principally contending that the mandatory conditions contained in Clause 12.29 had not been fulfilled.
Clause 12.29 is undoubtedly an extraordinary provision. It permits dismissal from service without conducting departmental/disciplinary proceedings and without serving notice or paying salary in lieu thereof, where the prescribed conditions are satisfied.But the rule does not confer an unqualified or unrestricted power.
The Hon’ble Court carefully dissected Clause 12.29 and identified four essential conditions:
There must be an investigation conducted by a State/UT/Central Investigating Agency;
The employee must be found involved, directly or indirectly, in terrorist or anti-national activities, or activities against national security or threatening the territorial sovereignty, security and integrity of the country;
Such investigation must be followed by an advice for removal or dismissal by the competent Government authority of the prescribed rank; and
Only thereafter can the Managing Director and CEO invoke the extraordinary power of dismissal without departmental proceedings.
This analysis forms the very foundation of the judgment.
The Court effectively emphasised that a power coupled with conditions is not an uncontrolled power. The authority exercising such power must first demonstrate that the conditions precedent to its exercise have been fulfilled.
Article 311 & Clause 12.29: A Crucial Distinction
One of the most significant aspects of the judgment is the Court’s refusal to accept the respondents’ argument that Clause 12.29 of the OSM is in pari materia with Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
Article 311 ordinarily protects civil servants against dismissal, removal or reduction in rank without an inquiry. However, Article 311(2) creates an exceptional situation where the President or Governor is satisfied that, in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. The respondents sought to rely upon this constitutional analogy to contend that the power under Clause 12.29 should receive similar treatment.
The Hon’ble Court, however, drew a clear distinction. Under Article 311(2) there is no express requirement that an investigation must first be conducted by an investigating agency and that such investigation must then be followed by advice from a specified Government authority.
Clause 12.29, on the other hand, expressly incorporates these safeguards. The Court therefore observed that the two provisions are materially different and that the power vested in the Managing Director and CEO of the Bank cannot simply be equated with the constitutional power vested in the President or Governor. This distinction is of considerable jurisprudential importance.
The Court observed that while the Constitution entrusts the President and Governor being high constitutional functionaries with an extraordinary power in matters concerning security of the State, the same level of constitutional trust cannot automatically be attributed to an officer such as the Managing Director and CEO of a bank. Consequently, the service rules themselves placed additional conditions upon the exercise of this extraordinary power. Moreover It concerns the broader relationship between administrative power and the rule of law.
What Does
“Investigation” Mean?
The most important controversy before the Court concerned the word “investigation.”
The petitioner argued that there had been no investigation within the meaning of Clause 12.29. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that investigation should be understood in a broad sense and that a formal FIR was not necessarily a prerequisite.
The Court considered the law relating to investigation and referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in H.N. Rishbud and another v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196.
The Court explained that investigation ordinarily involves a systematic process of ascertaining facts, collecting material/evidence, examining persons acquainted with the facts and forming an opinion on the basis of the material collected. Importantly, the High Court did not hold that registration of an FIR is invariably indispensable for every investigation contemplated by Clause 12.29.Instead, the Court focused on something more fundamental. There must actually be an investigative exercise. Mere intelligence inputs, information from sources or discreet verification could not, in the circumstances of the case, be automatically treated as the investigation contemplated by the Bank’s own service rule. Discreet Verification Is Not the Same as Investigation. This is perhaps the most striking factual and legal finding of the judgment.
The confidential report relied upon by the authorities was stated to be based upon information received from sensitive and credible sources and upon discreet enquiries. Material concerning social-media activity and the hashtag campaign “#TortureKashmir” was also relied upon. The Court examined this material but found that the report did not demonstrate the kind of investigative process contemplated by Clause 12.29.
The Court reasoned that information gathered from sources or through discreet enquiries does not, by itself, establish that an investigation has been undertaken. According to the judgment, such material was not accompanied by the investigative processes of collection of evidence/material and recording of statements that would establish the alleged involvement of the employee.
The judgment should not be read as diminishing the importance of national security. On the contrary, the Court expressly recognised that dismissal without inquiry may be justified in appropriate cases where the prescribed legal requirements are satisfied. The judgment therefore does not place national security against the rule of law. It places national security within the rule of law. That distinction is fundamental.
A constitutional democracy does not protect national security by abandoning legal procedure. It protects national security by creating lawful mechanisms through which extraordinary powers can be exercised responsibly, efficiently and fairly. Where the legislature, constitutional framework, service regulations or institutional rules prescribe certain conditions, those conditions serve a purpose. They act as a legal discipline upon the exercise of power.
The importance of the judgment lies in the balance it seeks to maintain. On one side stands the State’s legitimate and compelling interest in protecting national security and preventing activities prejudicial to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the country. On the other stands the equally important principle that a person employed under a regulated service framework cannot be deprived of his livelihood through an extraordinary procedure unless the legal conditions authorising such procedure are satisfied.
After examining the rival submissions, the confidential material and the applicable legal framework, the Hon’ble Court concluded that the requirements contemplated under Clause 12.29 had not been fulfilled.
Consequently, the Court quashed the dismissal order dated 15 July 2024 and restored the petitioner to the status he held immediately before the impugned order. Thus, the judgment was not an adjudication that no action could ever be taken against the petitioner. Rather, it was a declaration that the particular manner in which the dismissal had been effected did not satisfy the governing rule.
The decision carries significance well beyond the individual litigant.
Firstly, it reinforces procedural discipline. Administrative authorities cannot bypass mandatory conditions merely because the subject matter is sensitive.
Secondly, it distinguishes intelligence from investigation. Confidential inputs and discreet verification may be important sources of information, but where a service rule expressly requires an investigation, the legal requirement must be fulfilled in substance.
Thirdly, it places limits on delegated extraordinary powers. A power conferred upon an institutional head under service rules cannot automatically be equated with a constitutional power vested in the President or Governor.
The enduring value of this judgment prescribes a Larger Constitutional Lesson- that the rule of law does not demand that the State become powerless in the face of threats. It demands that power be exercised lawfully, responsibly and according to the rules that govern it. That is why the judgment deserves attention ,not merely as a service dispute, but as a judicial reminder that procedure is not an obstacle to justice; procedure is often the mechanism through which justice acquires legitimacy.
Conclusion
The judgment in Saadut Hussain Pampori v. UT of J&K & Ors. presents an important meditation on the limits of administrative discretion. Its central message is neither anti-administration nor anti-security. It is, fundamentally, pro-law. the judgment beautifully captures one of the foundational ideas of constitutional democracy by reflecting that the State is strongest when it acts through law and the law is strongest when even extraordinary power remains accountable to its prescribed limits.
In the final analysis, the judgment conveys a reassuring message to the citizen: the State is strong enough to protect its security, the administration is empowered to act when lawfully required, and the judiciary remains vigilant to ensure that every exercise of public power remains anchored to the rule of law
Notably, the judgment was pronounced by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Dhar on 29 August 2026 has been recorded as a speaking judgment. The order also records it as reportable. The matter, however, does not end with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The respondents have challenged the said judgment before the Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. The issues arising from the judgment are, therefore, presently subject to further judicial consideration. Nothing stated in this article is intended to prejudge the outcome of the pending proceedings, which remain entirely within the domain of the Hon’ble Court. The ultimate position in law will, accordingly, be determined by the appellate proceedings.
(The author is practicing Advocate in J&K High Court and Ladakh)
