Sajjad Bazaz
The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in response to the Government of India’s call to join India or Pakistan, decided to postpone a decision on the problem of accession, and to have a Standstill Agreement with both India and Pakistan. An offer of a Standstill Agreement was made by the Maharaja in telegrams on identical terms to both India and Pakistan on 12 August 1947. However, the State signed a Standstill Agreement only with Pakistan, and no agreement was executed with the Government of India prior to the State’s accession to India on 26 October 1947. The postal and telegraph facilities in the State were placed under the control of the Pakistan Government, which promised to continue the existing arrangements by which the State imported wheat, cloth, ammunition, kerosene oil and petrol from West Punjab.
Very soon, however, these amicable relations deteriorated. August ushered in a hideous wave of communal rioting in the whole of the Punjab. Thousands of Hindus and Sikhs were butchered in West Punjab and the North West Frontier Province and their women abducted, thousands of Muslims suffered the same fate in East Punjab Millions of refugees poured out from both, travelling in huge columns. The State of Jammu and Kashmir at first remained a haven for the victims of either side. The people of the State, irrespective of religion, maintained their traditional harmony and stuck to the idea of communal brotherhood. The State in fact became a corridor for the passage of Muslim refugees westward and the Hindu and Sikh refugees eastward. But, these refugees did not fail to excite their co-religionists in the State by the stories of their sufferings, and even tried to wreak their vengeance within the State on the co-religionists of those who had wronged them.
Units of the State’s army, commanded by Major-General Scott, tried their best to prevent these communal fracas and to punish those responsible for them. But when they took action against some Muslim trouble-makers in the Punch area, newspapers and leaders of the Muslim League in West Punjab declared that the Maharaja’s Dogratroops were murdering and terrorising the innocent Muslims of the State. On 29 August, the Maharaja of Kashmir received a telegram from one Raja Yakub Khan on behalf of the people of Hazara, alleging attacks on Muslims in Punch, and threatening “We are ready to enter the State fully equipped to fight with your forces. You are requested to ease the situation soon, otherwise be ready to bear the consequences.
About the beginning of September, raids began to take place from Pakistan into the border areas of the State. On 3 September, a band of raiders, several hundred strong, attacked the village of Kotha, 27 kmsouth-east of Jammu, and, when chased by troops of the State army, fled back into Pakistan. At the same time, another band of 500 raiders armed with service rifles of 303 calibre attacked some Hindu refugees and the State petrol reservoir at Chak Hana, 10 km south of Samba. On 4 September, General Scott wired to the State government at Srinagar, “Reliable reports state that on the 2nd and 3rd September, 1947, a band of up to 400 armed Sattis – Muslim residents mainly in Kahuta Tehsil of Rawalpindi district-were infiltrating into the State over the river Jhelum from Pakistan in the area of Owen, eleven miles (18 km) east of Kahuta. Their purpose is looting and attacking minority communities in the State.” The Prime Minister of the State sent a telegram the same day to the Chief Minister of West Punjab and the Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi, informing them of these raids and requesting measures to prevent the infiltration of raiders. The Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi replied denying the facts. And the raids continued, with Pak Army patrols intruding into the State on6 September and 13 September. On 17 September, a band of 400 armed raiders was met about 19 km south-east of Ranbirsinghpura andretreated into Pakistan after exchanging fire with the State’s armed police. On 22 September, further raids were reported from a place 10 km south-east of Samba. In the area of Punch also, trouble continued, and the State forces were compelled to deal with it with a heavy hand. The cry then went up that the Maharaja was trying to preserve his despotism by ruthlessly putting down the movement for democratic freedom among his subjects.
Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference, which was the biggest political party, was opposed to communalism, and his influence over the masses was undisputed. So, to help in curbing the wave of communal fury, Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison on29 September 1947.
But, instead of improving, the situation took a turn for the worse. On 4 October, an aeroplane was seen flying back and forth between Kohala and Palandri, obviously engaged m military reconnaissance of the area. The same day, about 400 raiders armed with tommy guns and bombs surrounded Chirala Feverish movement of uniformed mencarried in mechanical transport was noticed across the Pakistan border. Concentrations of tribal warriors were reported from Abbottabad. Theraiders were now giving battle to the small contingents of the State Force near Chirala and Bagh in Rawalkot area. On 10 October, more raids took place in the Jammu area, and during the night of 11/12 October, 500 armed raiders crossed the river Jhelum from Hazara and entered the Punch area. The raiders were not only better armed now, but were frequently assisted by batches of men in Pakistan Army’s uniform. Light machine guns and communication by wireless had begun to appear in the raider bands, while their probes over a wide arc of the frontier succeeded in splitting up the State Force into penny-packets strung out all along the border. The State’s army was being gradually immobilised, and its capacity for coherent strategic action destroyed. The stage was being set for the open invasion of Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan.
ECONOMIC BLOCKADE
While the raiders were securing the dispersal of the State’s army by their hit-and-run attacks, the Pakistan government was softening up the State by economic blockade Under the Agreement, the imports into the State were to be maintained at the normal level by the Pakistan government Kashmir’s economy being predominantly agricultural, the State was dependent on imports for many of the necessities of life. The most important of these were cloth and petrol, and the State also needed salt and rice from outside sources. Payment for these normal imports had already been made in most cases. But supplies were held up in Pakistan.
Pakistan also sought to freeze all communications in the State. Lack of petrol immobilised many of the lorry and truck fleets on which Kashmir depended for its internal transport. On 12 September 1947, the Post Office at Mirpur, under Pakistani control, refused to accept registered insured covers and money orders. One week later, the railway service from Sialkot to Jammu was suspended. Very soon, the Pakistan Post Offices within the State refused to operate the Savings Bank accounts of the people and to cash postal certificates. Chequesfrom the branches, within the State, of banks in West Punjab were not honoured, and remittances of money from the Lahore Currency Office for the Srinagar branch of Imperial Bank were stopped. The people suffered considerable hardships and trade came to a standstill. With all arteries blocked, a slow creeping paralysis set in within Jammu and Kashmir.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH PAKISTAN
About the end of September, the State government informed the Prime Minister of Pakistan about the stoppage of essential supplies and requested him to order their release. On 2 October, the Foreign Minster of Pakistan telegraphed a reply saying that they were trying their best to send the supplies, but due to the disturbances “drivers oflories are reluctant to carry supplies between Rawalpindi and Kohala, and it is impossible for us to spare troops for this escort.” This was a particularly lame excuse, for, as the State government pointed out, Very soon the problems of trade and raiding were lashed together. Pakistan, while expressing eagerness to send supplies, protested strongly against alleged atrocities by the State’s army on Muslims in Punch and against the reports of armed Sikhs infiltrating into Jammu. The State government denied both allegations, and asked Pakistan to stop armed raiders entering the State from Rawalpindi district to loot and murder people within the State. About the frozen imports, it acidly commented that the laudable intentions of the Pakistan government would not solve the problem when the supplies were actually held up by the local officials.
The situation deteriorated rapidly. The State troops were now in action against hordes of well-armed raiders all along the Pakistan border south and west of Punch, Fort Owen had to be evacuated by the State troops on 15 October, the Koth-Punch road was breached, and heavy concentrations of the raiders and bitter exchanges of fire were going on around Bhimbar, Mirpur and Mangla.
On 15 October, therefore, a cablegram was sent to the British Prime Minister detailing the raiders’ activities and the economic blockade, and requesting him to advise Pakistan to treat Kashmir with fairness and justice, “consistent with the good name and prestige of the Commonwealth of which it claims to be a member.’’On 18 October, astiffly worded telegram was despatched to Mohammad Ah Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan requesting them once again to stop raids into the State from Pakistan territory and send supplies. The telegram concluded that if Pakistan did not stop these raids, the State government would be compelled to seek “friendly assistance” in fulfilling its sacred duty of protecting its subjects and frontier. Liaquat Ali in his reply repeated the charge that the State army was killing and driving out Muslims, which must be stopped immediately, while Jinnah considered it almost an ultimatum, saying that the State authorities were putting up excuses to join the Indian Union. After the receipt of these telegraphic replies, Mehr Chand Mahajan, the Prime Minister of J & K State, sent another telegram on 22 October, trying to prove his contention about the raiders’ activities by quoting messages received from the agitated Hindus of Punch reporting grave danger from the Pakistani raiders and praying for quick reinforcements to save the situation.
Before anything could be done in response to their prayer, all hell was let loose in the Kashmir Valley.
THE INVASION PLAN
The invasion of the Kashmir Valley from Pakistan was planned with meticulous care and showed considerable strategic and tactical insight. The plan was first to split up the State’s army into tiny groups by means of hit-and-run attacks all along the long frontier with Pakistan. In trying to control these apparently uncoordinated attacks, the defending force was compelled to distribute itself into garrisons of platoon strength spread very thin indeed along the entire southern frontier. The terrain was hilly and communications primitive, so this distribution of the State army into innumerable tiny garrisons meant that it ceased to exist as a strong cohesive force able to offer battle to any strong invader anywhere along the frontier. The defending army was thus hamstrung most effectually. Vicious communal propaganda, at the same time, was turned in full blast at the State, and the Muslims in the frontier areas and in the State army were incited to rebel against the Hindu Maharaja and to murder their neighbours of the minority community.
The motive behind the Pak invasion of Jammu and Kashmir is not difficult to guess “When the British transferred power, one of the problems left unsolved by them was that of the tribal people, and Pakistan had to tackle it. Crores of rupees were spent by the British out of Indian revenues to appease these people, but the newly-born State of Pakistan could ill afford to spend so much money on them. Besides, the leaders of Pakistan have made Islam the basis of modern nationality, and all their high-sounding words would lose meaning if they treated the tribal people, their co-religionists, in the British way. There was again another menace growing rapidly in the N W F Province Badshah Khan (Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) started his Pathanistan Movement autonomy for the Pathans—and they were afraid lest it should disrupt Pakistan. It had to be nipped in the bud before the movement lured the Pathans both of the N W F. Province and the tribal areas into one hostile camp. The urgent need felt by Pakistan to force the issue of Kashmir, and secure its speedy accession to Pakistan contained the possibility of a solution of more than one problem. To hold out to thepoor tribal people the alluring promise of land and plenty in Kashmir, togive them a land description of the supposed atrocities done to Muslims so that they might be worked up to fever pitch, and allow them a free- run of the beautiful valley-why, this would secure Kashmir, solve the problem of the tribal people, kill the Pathanistan Movement and secure Pakistan’s safety and prosperity—all at one stroke.”
With passions aflame, lawlessness rampant and authority paralysed, the raiders struck. Thousands of tribal warriors swarmed acrossthe frontier, and, like a mighty flood, spread deep inside the State byevery bridle-road and mountain track. The main invasion was planned and launched by the Army Headquarters of Pakistan and was called‘ Operation Gulmarg’. Orders were issued through DO letters marked Personal/Top Secret and signed personally by the British C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, within a few days of Pakistan coming into existence. Conclusive proof of the Pakistan Army’s direct role in the invasion of J & K came to light through two different sources. The first was Major Onkar Singh Kalkat, then serving as Brigade Major at HQBannu Frontier Brigade Group, under Brigadier C P Murray. The Brigadier being away at Mirali outpost, Major Kalkat on 20 August1947 received and opened an envelope marked Personal/Top Secret, and found inside a letter from C-in-C, Pakistan Army, giving a detailed plan of ‘Operation Gulmarg’. He hastily called up the Brigadier, andwas advised not to breathe a word about it to anybody, or else he (Kalkat) would never be allowed to leave Pakistan alive. However, the Pak Army got scent of Major Kalkat’s knowledge of the ‘Operation Gulmarg’ plan. Consequently, he was put under virtual house-arrest inhis residence. But the officer made a daring escape and reached Ambalaon 18 October 1947. At night he boarded a goods train to reach Delhiinhaste. The following day he met Brig Kalwant Singh, the acting CGS,Col Thapar, the acting DMO, and Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister and told them about the Pakistani plan for ‘OperationGulmarg’. But this did not cut any ice with them. While Major Kalkat was in East Punjab to search out his family, which had arrived in India from Mianwali with the help of the local Deputy Commissioner,‘ Operation Gulmarg’ had already started on 22 October 1947, exactly according to the plan. The Indian authorities now realised their folly in showing indifference to Kalkat’s invaluable information, and couldtrace him at Amritsar only on 24 October. He was taken to Prime Minister Nehru, who shouted at the Defence Minister and the acting DMO for not taking necessary action in the light of Kalkat’s revelation.
The second source was Shri G.K Reddy, a journalist. On21October 1947, he took a trunk call and found it was from Lt-Col Alavi,(the PRO of GHQ, Pakistan Army), to API Lahore, Alavi, not suspecting that he was speaking to anyone but a Muslim, clearly stated that the attack on Ramkot (J & K Border Post) would begin that night.The subsequent progress of the invasion would be given to API Lahore by GHQ Rawalpindi every evening on phone, but must be published as communique from ‘Azad Kashmir Government’ under Palandri dateline, Palandri being given out as HQ of the ‘Azad Kashmir Government’. After escaping from Pakistan, Reddy gave out his story which was published in Blitz weekly of Bombay dated 9 June 1948.
According to ‘Operation Gulmarg’ plan, as described by Major Kalkat, every Pathan tribe was required to enlist at least one Lashkarof 1000 tribesmen. Separate instructions for their recruitment were issued to the Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents.
All Lashkars had to be concentrated at Abbottabad by 18 October. They were to be moved in civil buses which had been commandeered for this task, all moves taking place only at night. A separate area 16km outside Abbottabad was earmarked for the Lashkars and no civilians orunauthorised persons were to be allowed anywhere near it. In the overall plan, arrangements were made for the detailing of guides/informers from the so-called Azad Army, toall these tribal Lashkars on a very liberal scale. The D day for Operation Gulmarg was fixed as 22October 1947 on which date the various Lashkars were to cross into Jammu and Kashmir territory.
Unaware of the coming invasion, units of the J &K Regiment were already committed in tiny groups along the far-flung borders of the State. The Domel front was held by the 4th Jammu and Kashmir Infantrywith the headquarters of the battalion located at Domel.
The main strength of the defenders was at Domel where the two approach roads from Murree and Abbottabad (both inPakistan) met before leading towards Srinagar along the Jhelum gorge. The plan of the invaders was tactically sound and, in the beginning, brilliantly executed. The main attack had of necessity to be launched frontally along the motor road. Apart from rifles, the standard weaponof the raiders, the main force had also a few light machine guns and travelled in about 300 civilian lorries. The capture of Garhi on the Jhelum valley road between Domel and Srinagar, only some 13 km from the Pakistan border as the crow flies, would entrap the force defending Domel and make its annihilation a certainty.
FALL OF DOMEL AND BARAMULA
Early in the morning of 22 October, the main column of the raiders crossed the frontier from Garhi Habibullah and attacked Muzaffarabad. The raiders pressed on. They entered the prosperous town of Baramula in the evening of 26 October 1947. The place was promptly given over to plunder and rapine. A Kashmiri Muslim patriot, Maqbool Sherwani, was shotdead in the public square for professing to treat Hindus and Sikhs as his brothers. An Englishman, Col Dykes, and several of his assistant srunning the Missionary Hospital in Baramula, were also shot dead for what crime is still not known. Terror stalked the streets of the quaint little town. The inhabitants, Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims alike, left all their earthly possessions and fled to the hills. The deserted streetslay silent, echoing only to the rattle of the raiders’ nailed boots as they threaded their way between the corpses strewn around. A thick pall of smoke hung over the ravaged city, and flames from burning houses casta lurid glare over burnt out shells of what had been prosperous shops and smiling homes.
Yet in their success lay the seeds of their doom. For in the savage excitement of looting and raping, the ultimate goal of the ‘Holy War’was forgotten. Each man tried to grab as much wealth or as many girlsas he could, and for the moment refused to be bothered with the ‘infidel’Maharaja at Srinagar or the ‘liberation of the oppressed Muslims’of Kashmir. Many of the raiders, loaded with loot, turned back for home, and responded to their officers’ expostulations by saying that they wouldbe back soon after depositing their treasure in security. The advance on Srinagar was thus held up for a few days, and they proved crucial. ForinDelhi, hundreds of kms from stricken Baramula, it had at last been decided to save Kashmir in its hour of peril, and the Indian Army was ordered to step into the breach.’ Even as the barbaric raiders were satisfying their greed and lust in Baramula, transport planes full of Indian troops were winging their way through the azure autumn skies, destination Srinagar.
